Double Jeopardy: Promise or Poltergeist? by King, Stephen Warren
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PROMISE OR POLTERGEIST?
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Ohio recently decided
important issues of criminal and constitutional law in the case of State v.
Fletcher.' The court was called upon to decide whether the double
jeopardy clause in the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
was applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. If these double jeopardy provisions were considered
applicable to the states with regard to prosecutions in the federal jurisdic-
tions, the further question was raised whether the prohibition against
state action barred successive prosections in the state jurisdictions. The
Fletcher court was also required to interpret section 10, article I of the
Ohio Constitution to state whether Ohio law prohibited second state pros-
ecutions for the claimed criminal acts which induced a prior prosecution
in the federal jurisdiction.
The Fletcher court through Judge Day responded to the aforemen-
tioned issues affirmatively, based upon an extension of Benton v. Mary-
land2 and a reappraisal of Bartkus v. Illinois3 and Abbate v. United
States.4  What was basically at issue in Fletcher was whether one Michael
Fletcher and one Willie Walker could be prosecuted and punished by the
state of Ohio for the same claimed criminal acts5 which supported charges
pressed to a conclusion against them in the federal jurisdiction for the
Northern District of Ohio. This note will examine the legitimacy of the
court's conclusions and explore in some detail the major double jeopardy
cases decided in the United States and the precedents on which they were
based. Some alternative suggestions will also be presented as possible
solutions to the problems raised in the application of double jeopardy
protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The language of the fifth amendment0 seems at first blush to set
122 Ohio App. 2d 83 (1970).
2 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
3 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
4 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
5 On February 2, 1967, defendant Fletcher was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury
for robbery of a financial institution, with a count for the unlawful entry. Also on February 2,
1967, defendant Fletcher and defendant Walker were jointly indicted for robbery of a financial
institution, with a count for the unlawful entry. On January 27, 1967, defendant Fletcher was
charged by information on two counts for violations of Title 18, Section 2113 (a) and (c), U.S.
Code. The two counts charged (1) the armed robbery of a savings and loan association whose
deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and (2) the
receipt and concealment of money stolen from a bank whose deposits were insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. On February 8, 1967, defendant Walker was charged
by the indictment of a Federal Grand Jury with the violation of Title 18, Section 2113 (a), U.S.
Code.
0 State v. Fletcher, 15 Ohio Misc. 336 (1968), "Wherever the phrases 'double jeopardy' or
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forth a rather lucid conclusion unincumbered with arcane meanings. But
its message has been variously interpreted in such a fashion as to deny its
simplistic impression. It has been suggested by some that the structure
against double jeopardy had its origin in the Old Testament: "He will
make a full end; He will not take vengeance twice on his foes."T There
is also authority to suggest that the early Greek and Roman laws con-
tained proscriptive principles on double jeopardy." And in the eighteenth
century Blackstone stated:
First, the plea of autrefoits acquit (or a formal acquittal), is grounded on
this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is
to be brought into jeoprady of his life more than once for the same of-
fence. And hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a man is once
fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before
any court having competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such
acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime.9
So, at the English common law, the plea of autrefois convict or autrefois
acquit would have been a good plea in bar to a present prosecution if a
prior prosecution was for the same offense.' ° Reflecting this same prin-
ciple the Court in Ex Parte Lange,"' stated:
The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same
offense, but it went further and forbid a second trial for the same offence,
whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether in the
former trial he had been acquitted or convicted.12
Simply stated, once a defendant is acquitted or convicted of crime for
his conduct in a particular set of circumstances he should be able to
consider the matter closed and plan his life ahead without the threat of
subsequent prosecution and possible imprisonment for the same conduct.13
Generally speaking, the basic policy behind the double jeopardy protec-
tion is the avoidance of multiple prosecution and multiple punishment
for the same offense. These two considerations represent distinct policy
questions, the former being basically a procedural consideration and the
latter essentially a substantive law consideration. Problems began to erupt
in the development of the common law of double jeopardy when a dis-
tinction was drawn between an "act" and an "offense". Under the early
'successive prosecutions' are used, they are assumed to mean one prosecution followed by another,
both flowing from the same act, with the essential difference between the two Proceedings being
the 'sovereignty,' i.e., state or federal, under whose auspice the charge is laid."
71 Nahum 9.
8 J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, 2, (1969).
9 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 335 (1899).
10See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMETARIES § 378-379 (Jones Ed. 1916).
1185 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
121d. at 169.
13 Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Mori-
bund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 389 (1956).
[Vol. 32.
NOTES
English common law there was a single count charged in the indictment
for which there was either an acquittal or a single punishment. 4 But
with the advent of the multiple count indictment the problem of multiple
punishment for the same act began to appear.
Historically, the development of the notion that multiple prosecutions
were a particularly pernicious practice to be avoided was spurred by the
fact that criminal penalties were extremely harsh. It was correctly ob-
served that the government should have but one attempt to muster its
resources to establish the guilt of the defendant with regard to a particu-
lar act he was alleged to have committed.
The reason normally advanced for protecting against multiple pun-
ishment is that otherwise no rule of law can be established. A prospective
defendant should know that there are certain standards and limitations
by which he will be judged and not an arbitrary system tempered only by
the whim and caprice of judges.
Having glanced briefly at the policy behind the double jeopardy pro-
tection, some introductory observations are pertinent to question whether
a rule allowing successive federal-state prosecutions for the same act is
consistent with the policies behind the double jeopardy protection. A
great deal of litigation has occurred in these United States in which an
attempt to resolve the dilemma of how to define "same offense" has taken
place. Various tests have been advanced to provide guidelines, including
the "same evidence"' 5, test and a variation of that test, the "same trans-
action" test.' A test that has also received a great deal of attention is
the one announced in the old English case of Rex v. Vandercomb and
Abbott,' where the Court stated:
IT]hat unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have
been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the second indict-
ment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second.' 8
The policy has esoterically developed, however, that the tests, as im-
precise as they might be, to determine whether a defendant is being tried
twice for the same offense are abandoned as being inapplicable when
violations of the statutes of the state and federal governments are in-
volved. The type of double jeopardy to which a defendant is exposed
as a result of successive prosecutions by two sovereigns for the same
offense has been somehow viewed as an exception to the normal policy.
But it would seem that the exception is unwarranted. If society has been
14 Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and
Abbate v. United States, 14 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 700, 712 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Poan-
tikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy].
15 See Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 639 (1915).
16 Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918).
17 2 Leach C.C. 708 (1796).
18 Id. at 720.
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injured but once, any offenses connected with that one injury are identi-
cal. That is, if indictments charge the same act and the same intent they
charge the same crime.19
If the focus of the double jeopardy structure were solely directed
toward the interests of individual defendants, many of the problems that
have cropped up in litigation in the United States might easily be absent.
But the fact that our system of government is a federal system has caused
the peculiar development that a defendant may be subjected to successive
trials in the state and federal jurisdictions for the same act or offense.
The concept that allows such successive trials has been yclept "dual sov-
ereignty." This theory was definitively stated in Moore v. Illinois:20
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.
He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to
punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may
be an offense or transgression of the laws of both.21
The underlying theory of dual sovereignty is that because the laws of two
sovereigns are involved, the same act produces two offenses so that a
second prosecution does not put the defendant in jeopardy for the "same
offense."
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
In 1959 the Supreme Court decided Bartkus and Abbate, the former
allowing a state prosecution after a federal acquittal for the same alleged
criminal act and the latter upholding a federal prosecution after the
defendants had plead guilty to the same criminal act in Illinois state
court and received sentences of three months' imprisonment each. Before
these decisions are scrutinized, however, an analysis of United States v.
Lanza" is necessary since Bartkus relied in great measure on Lanza, and
Abbate refused to overrule Lanza. Commenting on the Court's refusal
to overrule Lanza, Mr. Justice Brennan stated for the majority in Abbate:
No consideration or persuasive reason not presented to the Court in the
prior cases is advanced why we should depart from its firmly established
principles. On the contrary, undesirable consequences would follow if
Lanza were overruled. The basic dilemma was recognized over a century
ago in Fox v. Ohio.23 As was there pointed out, if the States are free to
prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and the resultant state prose-
cutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal law en-
forcement must necessarily be hindered.2
19 Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROoKLYN L REV.
79, 87 (1938).
20 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
21 d. at 19.
22260 U.S. 377 (1922).
2346 U.S. (5. How.) 410 (1847).
24 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
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In Lanza the defendants were charged with manufacturing, transporting
and possessing intoxicating liquor in violation of the Volstead Act. The
defendants claimed that the prosecution was barred by a prior prosecution
under a Washington statute for manufacturing, transporting and pos-
sessing intoxicating liquor. The defendants argued that the second pro-
secution was in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment. But Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority of the Court, held
that the fifth amendment was inapplicable because the state and federal
governments were two sovereigns and two offenses were involved even
though the acts were identical in all other aspects.2 5 Stating his conclu-
sion Chief Justice Taft revealed:
But it is not for us to discuss the wisdom of legislation it is enough for us
to hold that, in the absence of special provision by Congress, conviction
and punishment in a state court under a state law for making, transporting
and selling intoxicating liquors is not a bar to a prosecution in a court of
the United States under the federal law for the same acts.20
It has been suggested by some writers that the precedent on which Lanza
was based was weak and not in point for the proposition advanced in
Lanza.7 That authority began with the Fox case in 1847 which held that
the state of Ohio might punish the passing of counterfeit money as a
private cheat on the citizens of Ohio without colliding with the exclusive
federal power to punish the actual counterfeiting.2  There were actually
two distinguishable offenses involved in Fox but the Court in dictum went
on to state that even if the offenses were the same, each government would
have the right to prosecute and punish independently for the same crime.
Thus the Court implicitly announced a dual sovereignty rationale without
a proper case for such a pronouncement before the Court.
In United States v. Marigold,9 the defendant challenged the right
of Congress to punish the circulation of counterfeit currency as distinct
from its manufacture. The Court, however, distinguished Fox and held
that Congress did have the power to punish circulation on the basis of its
right to regulate currency. Since the issue in Marigold was whether
Congress could punish the circulation of counterfeit money and not suc-
cessive prosecutions the Court's statement of the right of the state and
federal governments to prosecute where the same act violates a statute
of each without one prosecution barring the other3 must be considered
dictum.
2 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
261d. at 385.
27 Pondkes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, supra Note 14, at 700.
28 U.S. CoNsE. Art. I, § 8, cl. 6. '"To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the
Securities and current Coin of the United States."
20 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
-0 Id. at 569.
19711
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In Moore v. Illinois,3 1 the validity of an Illinois law against the har-
boring of fugitive slaves was drawn into question since Congress had
already spoken in this area. Though the question of successive prose-
cutions was not involved, when the issue of double jeopardy was raised
the Court's answer came in terms of dual sovereignty. The Court stated
that there were two offenses because the same act violated the law of two
sovereigns&2
In United States v. Cruikshank,13 also relied on in part by Lanza, the
sufficiency of a complaint under the Civil Rights Act was involved and
the discussion of dual sovereignty was merely superficially relevant.
Ex Parte Siebold,4 involved the constitutionality of a federal statute
controlling election procedure. The states also had statutes controlling
election procedure and since the federal statute was upheld by the Court
the argument was advanced that there was a possibility of double punish-
ment for violation of both state and federal election laws. The Court
answered that when one act violates the statutes of two sovereigns, there
are two separate offenses and cited the dicta in Fox, Marigold, Cruikshank
and Moore.
In Cross v. North Carolina,;5 the defendant was prosecuted for cir-
culating a false note. The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the
state court on the ground that he had violated a federal statute which
outlawed making false entries on the books of national banks. The Court,
however, found that two separate offenses were involved and upheld juris-
diction. But the discussion in the case stated that there were two offenses
in any event since the act violated the laws of two sovereigns. This was
dictum since there was no discussion in the opinion regarding successive
prosecutions.
Pettibone v. United States,36 was a case where the defendants were
charged with conspiring to obstruct the administration of a federal court.
The dual sovereignty theory was discussed only tangentially since the Court
found that the conspiracy alleged in the indictment did not violate both
state and federal statutes.
The first case in which the dual sovereighty theory was necessary to the
decision was Crossley v. California. The defendant was convicted in
California for causing the death of an engineer by derailing a train. An
appeal was based on the ground that since the train carried mail exclusively,
California had no jurisdiction. The Court rejected defendant's argument
31 55 U.S. (14 How.) 12 (1852).
3 21d. at 20.
3392 U.S. 542 (1875).
34 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
36 132 U.S. 131 (1889).
36 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
37 168 US. 640 (1898).
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by stating that because the state and federal governments were separate
sovereigns, each could punish an act which was an offense under its law.
However, the basic issue was whether California could punish an act which
was punishable by federal statute-not successive prosecutions.
In Southern Ry. v. Railroad Commissioner,38 the defendant was charged
with a violation of the Indiana Safety Appliance Act for failure to provide
safety equipment on its railroad cars. This case did deal with successive
federal-state prosecutions for the same offense since the defendant had
been previously convicted under the Federal Safety Appliances Act for the
same omissions. But double prosecution was not allowed since the Court
found that Congress had preempted the field under the interstate commerce
clause. The cases announcing the dual sovereignty theory were distin-
guished on the ground that in those cases the state had concurrent juris-
diction.
In Gilbert v. Minnesota,39 the defendant challenged the constitution-
ality of a Minnesota statute which outlawed advocating against conscrip-
tion on the ground that regulation of the Army was exclusively vested in
Congress. The Court found that the purpose of the statute to build up the
Army and inspire patriotism was a valid one and forecasted no possibility
of conflict between the state and federal governments. The Court discussed
dual sovereignty only in support of its basic argument. The possibility of
successive prosecutions was not mentioned.
The last case to be cited by Lanza was McKalvey v. United States,4 in
which the defendants were charged with the federal offense of obstructing
free passage over lands owned by the United States. The defendants argued
that the statute encroached on the police power of the state and was there-
fore unconstitutional. But the Court replied that the state offense involved
would be one of personal violence, a crime quite different from the obstruc-
tion of free passage.41 Although the Court did discuss the dual sovereignty
theory and expressed the opinion that the same act may be an offense against
both sovereigns,42 that was not the issue and successive prosecutions were
not involved. So, a trip through Lanza's questionable past reveals that its
birth was less than a legitimate one and also casts doubt on it progeny,
Bartkus and Abbate.
The latter opinions both cited as precedent the decision in Screws v.
United States,43 which can also be shown to be unsuitable as precedent for
the propositions advanced in Bartkus and Abbate. Sheriff Screws was
charged with beating to death a Negro prisoner in his custody and under
38236 U.S. 439 (1915).
30 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
40 260 U.S. 353 (1922).
41 Id. at 358.
421d. at 358-359.
43325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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Georgia law would presumably have been guilty of murder. But Screws was
prosecuted by the federal authorities under the Civil Rights Act.44 Both
the federal and state laws in this case have separate and distinct policy con-
siderations. The Georgia law was of course, designed to protect the taking
of life; the Federal statute was calculated to prevent one acting as a represen-
tative of the state's police power from depriving the Negro defendant of
certain rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
It happened to be coincidental that Screw's act of beating to death a Negro
prisoner transgressed the letter and policy of both the federal and state
statutes. The fact was that Screws did in fact commit two distinguishable
offenses. The dual sovereignty theory need not have been resorted to in
Screws to justify two prosecutions for the same act. Furthermore, the Court
in Abbate and Bartkus-need not have been unduly concerned about the state
and federal government barring prosecutions by each other unless the dual
sovereignty theory were applied.
A closer look at Bartkus and Abbate is now required. In Bartkus the
petitioner was tried in the Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois for robbery of a federally insured savings and loan associa-
tion.45 The case was tried to a jury and Bartkus was acquitted. Approxi-
mately three weeks hence the defendant was indicted by an Illinois grand
jury. The Illinois indictment recited substantially the same facts contained
in the federal indictment but charged Bartkus for violating an Illinois rob-
bery statute.48 Bartkus was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of
Cook County and was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Illinois
Habitual Criminal Statute.41 Bartkus' plea of aut-refois acquit was rejected
by both the trial court and the Illinois Supreme Court. Speaking for the
majority of the court in affirming Bartkus' conviction, Mr. Justice Frank-
further reported:
We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of
the provisions of the first eight amendments as such. The relevant his-
torical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars.
These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members
of the legislatures of the ratifying States did not contemplate that the
Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand incorporation of the first eight
amendments making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the
States.48
Mr. Justice Frankfurter seemed to lay great stress on the fact that the con-
stitutions of the states who ratified the fourteenth amendment and the states
44 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1948).
4 6 ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 38, § 501 (1919).
4 7 ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 38, § 602 (1883).
4 8 Bardkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
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who entered the union after the ratification had provisions obviously dif-
ferent from the requirements of the Bill of Rights-in particular the fifth,
sixth and seventh amendments which Mr. Justice Frankfurter used as an
illustration. In the case of each new admission the Court noted that either
the President of the United States or the Congress or both found that the
entering state's constitution was in conformity with the Enabling Act4 and
the Constitution of the United States.1 The Court further observed that
there was no warrant to believe that the states in adopting constitutions
with the specific purpose of complying with the requisites of admission
were in fact wading the demands of the Constitution of the United States."
The Court then stated:
Surely this compels the conclusion that Congress and the States have al-
ways believed that the Due Process Clause brought into play a basis of
restrictions upon the states other than the undisclosed incorporation of the
original eight amendments.52
The latter language of course aligns with the reasoning of the Court in
Palko v. Connecticut,53 that categorically resisted the notion of a wholesale
incorporation of the first eight amendments into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
After noting that twenty-seven of the twenty-eight states which had
considered the validity of successive state and federal prosecutions as against
a challenge of violation of either a state double jeopardy provision or a com-
mon law evidentiary rule of autrafois acquit or autrafois convict had refused
to rule that the second prosecution was or would be barred, the Court in
Bartkus concluded:
With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state and federal
courts have for years refused to bar a second trial even though there had
been a prior trial by another government for a similar offense, it would
be in disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive
adjudication for the Court now to rule that due process compels such a
bar.54
The Court therefore could not find within the four corners of the Consti-
tution sufficient reason to prohibit successive federal-state prosecutions even
though the net effect of such prosecutions is substantially the same as suc-
cessive federal prosecutions for the same offense, insofar as the defendant
is concerned. This result was seized upon by Mr. Justice Black in dissent
who concluded in effect that individual rights had been sacrificed upon the
49 37 Star. 1728 (1912).
6O Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 126 (1959).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
5 4 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136 (1959).
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altar of "federalism." Mr. Justice Black's view was made abundantly clear
thusly:
The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the same
act is somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Fed-
eral Government and the other by a State. Looked at from the standpoint
of the individual who is being prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me
to grasp. If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two
'Sovereigns' to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is empha-
sized, that danger is surely no less when the power of the State and Fed-
eral governments is brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when
one of these 'Sovereigns' proceeds alone. In each case, inescapably, a man
is forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.m5
Mr. Justice Black's position in Bartkus could be predicted as he moved
farther away from his confidence in the Palko decision. That Mr. Justice
Black was less than enthusistic about Palko was aptly indicated in his dis-
senting opinion in Adamson v. California.2
If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palko decision
applying some of the Bill of Rights to the States, or the Twining57 rule
applying none of them, I would choose the Palko selective process. But
rather than accept either of these choices, I would follow what I believe
was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all
of the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.
To hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill
of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the
great design of a written Constitution. 58
I have taken the liberty of going to some length to present the position
of Mr. Justice Black regarding the incorporation of the first eight amend-
ments of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment since the recent trend of the Court has been to reject Palko's
restrictiveness by incorporating all of the protections of the Bill of Rights
directed at criminal proceedings. The trend began in 1961 when the
fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
was applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment5 9 The following protections of the Bill of Rights have been
subsequently applied to the states: protection from cruel and unusual
punishment;60 right to counsel at trial;"' right to counsel during interro-
gation;6 2 freedom from compelled self-incrimination; 3 freedom from com-
55 Id. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).
56 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
57 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
58 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947).
59 M app v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
60 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
61 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
62 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
03 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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ment on defendant's failure to testify;4 right to confront witnesses;65 the
right to jury trial on a serious criminal offense;68 and the protection against
double jeopardy. 67
Before proceeding to the decision in Benton v. Maryland68 that has ap-
plied the double jeopardy protection to the states, some reflection on the
Abbate decision is necessary. The defendants in Abbate were indicted by
the state of Illinois for violating an Illinois statute making it a crime to
conspire to injure or destroy the property of another.69 The defendants
entered pleas of guilty to the indictment and were each sentenced to three
months' imprisonment. Thereafter indictments were returned in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against
the defendants charging "the offense of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by con-
spiring to destroy, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1362 certain works, property
and material known as coaxial repeater stations and micro wave towers...
operated and controlled by the United States." 70  The defendants were
found guilty. In the majority opinion authored by Mr. Justice Brennen,
who dissented in Bartkus based upon a belief that the state prosecution
was in actuality a second federal prosecution, the Court in Abbate affirmed
the conviction of the defendants. The reasoning in Abbate pursued simi-
lar lines as that in Bartkus with the apprehension expressed that were the
decision to be otherwise federal law enforcement might be fettered. The
Bartkus Court felt there was a danger of federal interference with the
enforcement of state law-particularly in the area of civil rights.
III. NEW DIRECTIONS
The strength and vitality of Bartkus and Abbate have been substantially
affected by the Court's 1969 decision in Benton, though the Court declined
to overrule either decision. The defendant was tried in a Maryland state
court for burglary and larceny but convicted only of burglary and sen-
tenced to ten years in prison. Because the grand and petit juries in the
defendant's case had been selected under an invalid constitutional provi-
sion the case was remanded to the trial court and the defendant was given,
and exercised, the option of demanding reindictment and retrial. The
defendant was reindicted for larceny and burglary and he filed a motion
to dismiss the larceny count on the ground of former jeopardy. The court
denied the motion and on retrial Benton was found guilty of both crimes
and concurrently sentenced to fifteen years for burglary and five years for
04 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
O Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
68 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
67 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); See also 15 VILL. L .R1Ev. 233, 235 (1965).
68 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
69 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 139 (1919).
70 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 188-189 (1959).
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larceny. The appellate court ruled against petitioner on the issue of dou-
ble jeopardy and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court then con-
sidered two very important issues relative to the applicability of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Concomitantly, the Court considered the question of
whether the petitioner was twice put in jeopardy. In answering both of
the aforementioned in the affirmative the Court overruled Palko as far as
it was inconsistent with the Benton holding. The Court stated:
[W]e today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage,
and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
The Court seemed to rely heavily on the recent trend established by the
line of cases from Mapp v. Ohio72 through Duncan v. Louisiana7 a as stand-
ing for the proposition that the "[C]ourt has 'increasingly looked to the
specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights) to determine whether a state
criminal trial was conducted with due process of law'. '7 4  On the other
hand the Court compared Palko to several cases that had been overruled
in the wake of the trend toward looking to the Bill of Rights to measure
the propriety of state action in criminal trials. The Court stated:
Our recent cases have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic con-
stitutional rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the
circumstances does not disclose a denial of 'fundamental fairness.' 5
The Court analogized the double jeopardy protection to the right to trial
by jury on a serious criminal offense which the Duncan decision had found
to be "fundamental to the American scheme of justice '76 and held that the
double jeopardy protection was also dearly fundamental as well.77  That
being so, the Court concluded:
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice' . . . the same constitutional
standards apply against both State and Federal Governments.78
The Benton Court was more favorably inclined to accept that the Anglo
Saxon common law has visited upon us the view that double jeopardy is a
basic right whether the protection is asserted in a state or federal forum.
The Bartkus Court seemed to suggest in footnote 9 that some of the En-
7 1 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
72367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
74 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1959).
751d. at 795.
7 6 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
77 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).
7ld. at 795.
[Vol. 32
NOTES
glish precedent relative to double jeopardy could not be legitimately relied
upon or applied in a federal system. The Court's view was stated thusly:
It has not been deemed relevant to discussion of our problem to consider
dubious English precedents concerning the effect of foreign criminal judg-
ments on the ability of English Courts to try charges arising out of the
same conduct-dubious in part because of the confused and inadequate
reporting of the case on which much is based. .. . Such precedents are
dubious also because they reflect a power of discretion vested in English
judges not relevant to the constitutional law of our federalism. 79
So, again the concept of federalism seems to be the justification to which
the Court returns to allow successive prosecutions of a defendant for the
same offense. What is it then that inheres in federalism that compels
such ersatz justice? Some would argue that were it not for the Court's
refusal to bar second prosecutions by the state or federal government that
many instances would arise where a defendant might receive a lighter pun-
ishment than he "deserved," that forum shopping would occur and that
the "interest" of the barred forum would be undercut. However, I would
concede that even if these anxieties were justified, it is indeed a peculiar
justice that permits an individual to be harassed and his interests sacrificed
due to speculation that the institutional system might be exposed to some
hardship-and in some instances perhaps fail to get its "pound of flesh."
If federal government is to be "the sublime conception of a nation in
which every citizen lives under two complete and well-rounded systems of
laws ... moving one within the other noiselessly and without friction,"8
then some less truculent reconciliation of government and individual liber-
ty is required. Successive prosecutions for a single act, even though by
distinct sovereignties, each acting under its own laws, would certainly seem
to violate both the principles of the common law, and the genius of our
free government.8'
The Benton decision provided a partial answer to the double jeopardy
dilemma by applying the double jeopardy stricture of the fifth amendment
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
But Benton did not reach the question "whether the federal proscription
against double jeopardy prevents a state prosecution following a federal
acquittal or conviction."' The Fletcher decision recognized that the Ben-
ton rule reached the issue of prior jeopardy in one jurisdiction as a bar to
a later prosecution in a second jurisdiction only by implication.83 But the
Court believed that the implications of Benton were enough to deprive
both Abbate and Bartkus of any future force. The Court commented:
70 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128 N. 9. (1959).
80J. FISKE, THE CRITIcA.L PERIOD Op AmEICAN HISTORY 301 (4th Ed. 1889).
81 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
82 State v. Fletcher, 22 Ohio App. 2d 83, 87 (1970).
831d. at 92.
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"[clertainly the principle of Abbate mounts no constitutional mandate
binding state courts not to treat a prior federal jeopardy as a bar to subse-
quent criminal proceedings by the states."' 4 The Fletcher court, seeming-
ly feeling that it had been cast into the role of soothsayer by the Benton
implications estimated that the Supreme Court would eventually overrule
Bartkus and Abbate since the reasoning propounded in Benton to pro-
scribe successive "state on state" jeopardy was equally applicable to other
successive jeopardies "where the singular distinction between the causes
stems from the jurisdiction in which the first action is begun.""5  The
Court further justified its prediction on the ground that Palko had been
overruled by Benton, thereby further weakening Bartkus and Abbate. The
court therefore concluded that:
[I]t is incompatible with fundamental justice that a person who has been
charged with crime be exposed to jeopardy for the same act first in the
federal system and then a second time in the courts of this state. This is
so whether "Due Process" in the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the
double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment or not. For the
double menace from the single act is 'repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind.'86
The court then addressed itself to a consideration of the former jeopar-
dy issue under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. After re-
viewing some of the cases decided in Ohio that were thought to be in point
on the issue of dual sovereignty and double jeopardy,8 7 the Court deter-
mined that these cases were inapplicable and moreover that the dual sov-
ereignty issue was one of first impression in Ohio-save for the policy
outlined in The Ohio Constitution: "No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense." 8's In determining that this language
should be conclusively interpreted to state in behalf of Ohio that succes-
sive federal-state prosecutions would not be allowed the Court responded:
The evils that policy was meant to proscribe are not improved because the
state and federal sovereignties combine to generate them. It would be in-
congruous to allow a basic constitutional policy of a state, determined as
an aspect of its sovereignty, to be frustrated by a consequence of the dual-
ity which allows that sovereignty to exist. Furthermore, it would be both
inconsistent and ironic to use that federalism, which is justified in the
name of protecting freedom, to obliterate a fundamental right.89
Whether the Ohio court is correct in its expectation that were the
Court to reconsider Bartkus and Abbate they would fall in the wake of
84 Id.
851d. at 93.
861d. at 94.
87 See Koch v. State, 53 Ohio St. 433 (1895); State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio St. 522 (1930).
8 8 Omo CoNsT. Art I, § 10.
89 Fletcher v. State, 22 Ohio App. 2d 83, 99 (1970).
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Benton will have to remain to be seen. I would contend that federalism
ought to be a resilient enough governmental concept that proper adminis-
tration of justice within its framework does not depend on placing an in-
dividual in jeopardy more than once for the same offense. If statutes of
both the state and federal governments are based on substantially the
same policy, in a given circumstance, a single act is violative of a single
policy, and thereby can constitute only one offense. It seems irrational
and unnecessary to attempt to distinguish two policies which are otherwise
substantially similar merely on the basis of different sovereigns. "Even
if it can be said that each sovereign has a different 'interest' ["ilf the
policies of both statutes are substantially similar, what is the difference
between the "interest" of one sovereign and that of the other?"90 Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning one might easily arrive at the conclusion that
the Fletcher court was correct in its resolution of the issues before it since
the statutory policy of each jurisdiction there was substantially similar.
Without resorting to subtle nicities one can also conclude that the de-
fendants in Bartkus and Abbate should have had to only be exposed to
jeopardy once since the state and federal statutes in each case were de-
signed to prevent in great measure the same act.
The argument here presented on behalf of the notion that the dual
sovereignty theory ought to be abandoned as a justification for successive
prosecutions will proceed on the assumption that in point of fact sub-
stantially the same offense is involved. When one focuses away from
the "interests" of government in successive prosecutions it becomes rather
more dear that an individual defendant whose resources cannot match
those which the government might marshall against him should be able
to concentrate his resources in one trial to establish his freedom from guilt.
Otherwise, a defendant may be subjected to substantial mental anguish,
embarrassment and expense, all of which can only serve to harass the de-
fendant and in fact punish him. I do not think our substantive criminal
law or the society it is designed to protect are well served by a system
that allows such legal harassment. "Multiple trials also increase the pos-
sibility of convicting an innocent man, and the threat of further prosecu-
tion makes it difficult for an acquitted defendant to resume his role in
society."'" It is germane to note again at this point that it makes not a
scintilla of difference to a particular defendant, in terms of his interest,
whether the successive trials take place in the same forum or different
forums. It is the fact of having been exposed to jeopardy twice for the
same act that is objected to-period.
The primary responsibility for the administration of criminal law nor-
90 Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, supra Note 14, at 713.
91 Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in Federal-
ism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538, 1540 (1967).
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mally rests with the individual states. The federal criminal law is aimed
at supplementing state law in areas where federal investigative resources
can best aid the states and where the criminal activity sought to be pro-
scribed is apt to be interstate 2 And in these areas there is no substantial
evidence to lead to the conclusion that the state will be lethargic in obtain-
ing convictions if successive prosecutions are prohibited.
On the other hand, there has been a rather strong indication that na-
tional interests do not generally require federal prosecution after a state
trial. After the Abbate decision the United States Attorney General issued
a release declaring that no federal prosecution would follow a state trial
for the same act except in unusual circumstances and then only with his
express approval 3 In stating such a policy the Attorney General merely
gave present expression to an anticipation announced some one hundred
twenty-seven years ago in Fox v. Ohio:
It is almost certain, that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions,
both of the State and federal system are administered, an offender who
should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be
subjected a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially the
same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or
where the public safety demanded extarordinary rigor.94
If there are areas of conflict and lack of cooperation in the areas of con-
current criminal jurisdiction there should be concentrated efforts to elimi-
nate their occurrence and not a tendency to let such instances be respon-
sible for overall policy.
There are actually four competing considerations operating in the dou-
ble jeopardy imbroglio: the individual, the state government, the federal
government and the communities right to effective law enforcement."'
There have been several solutions offered to accommodate interests. One
possible solution that has been advanced is that statutes be enacted which
would bar prosecutions after a prior conviction or acquittal in another
jurisdiction. For example, the New York statute reads as follows:
When an act charged as a crime is within the jurisdiction of another state,
territory or country, as well as within the jurisdiction of this state, a con-
viction or acquittal thereof in the former, is a bar to a prosecution or in-
dictment therefor in this state.96
Mr. Justice Frankfurter alluded to the statutory solution and the New
York statute specifically in Bartkus: "Finally, experience such as that of
New York may give aid to Congress in its consideration of adoption of
921d. at 1551.
93 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (1959).
94 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 434 (1847).
95 See Note, Doable jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Suggested
Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 252, 265 (1961).
96 N.Y. CODE CRiM. PRoc. tit. I, § 139 (1958).
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similar provisions in individual federal criminal statutes or in the federal
criminal code."97
Another rather unique innovation that has been suggested to solve the
dual sovereignty problem is that of a joint trial.9 8 Herein the trial would
be conducted by both the federal law and state governments. The respon-
sibility would be on defendant's counsel to give notice of the action against
his client to other jurisdictions, state or federal, which would have a right
to prosecute. The second jurisdiction would be subsequently barred from
instituting an action if they did not indicate their intention so to do. If
both jurisdictions decided in favor of prosecutions a joint trial would be
held and the greater of the two possibilities of punishment would provide
the maximum measure which could be inflicted. Trial would be held in
the court system of the jurisdiction where the prosecution was initially
instituted. This procedure would also have the ancillary benefit of allevi-
ating the prospect of forum shopping.
Since it is unlikely that a case will be placed before the Court in the
relatively near future that will present a fact situation having the character-
istics necessary to permit a holding that will establish dear guidelines for
double jeopardy protection, the legislature should act without undue delay.
A statute that would prescribe what matters of law and fact should be
presented in one proceeding would be extremely helpful. The statute
should also prescribe that in cases of possible conflict between the federal
and state authorities with respect to what substative law is to be enforced
that the United States Attorney or his representative confer with the state
officials to decide what course of action would best promote the interest of
society. To facilitate a conference of the type suggested the statute might
list considerations that should be taken into account in deciding whether
an act has characteristics of a federal or state violation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Xhatever solutions are adopted to accommodate the interests of all
concerned at some future indeterminate time it is felt that the Fletcher de-
cision is the right beginning-although the case rests primarily on a pre-
cognitive notion of what the Supreme Court may do. This nation can
operate efficiently in the administration of criminal law without subjecting
a defendant to the judicial machinery of both state and federal govern-
ments, and will in fact do so once the judiciary soundly denounces the dual
sovereignty justification for depriving individual defendants of the right
to be free of successive prosecutions.
97 Bartkms v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 139 (1959).
98 Note, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Suggested Solution,
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 252, 266 (1961).
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It is hoped that the Court will one day soon answer the following with
a resounding "negative":
Shall we fritter away our liberties upon a metaphysical subtlety, two sov-
ereignties? 99
It is time to recognize that justice under our federal system of government
can be achieved without placing a defendant between Scylla and Charybdis.
Stephen Warren King
99 Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1309, 1331 (1932).
